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WHO'S THE PATIENT?
MARTHA MINOW*
INTRODUCTION
As entertainment, confusion can be a rich source of comedy. In
health care, in contrast, confusion can be a silent danger to crucial
policy judgments. In comedy, a classic routine starts with the ques-
tion, "Who's on first?" asked by a baseball fan who does not know that
the first baseman's name is "Who." Similarly, in health care, a classic
set of difficulties circle around without addressing the basic question,
"who is the patient?" I will suggest today that despite the nearly uni-
versal assumption that patients are single bodily individuals, a range of
circumstances require clinicians to treat families, household mem-
bers, sexual partners, and even entire communities as patients. By
asking "who's the patient?" I hope to illuminate how contemporary
discussions of the doctor-patient relationship wrongly proceed with
the assumption that the patient is alone in this relationship and that
cases involving families and friends are the unusual, complicated
ones. Instead, I suggest that the normal case is one involving family
and perhaps friends, and the conception of the roles of doctors and
nurses must be shaped in this context.
The recognition that families and friends are crucially involved in
the doctor-patient relationship is especially challenging to the still-re-
cent arrival of patient autonomy as a central commitment in medical
ethics. What can and what should autonomy of the individual patient
mean in light of the relationships with others that can be crucial in
preventing, diagnosing, treating, and managing health conditions?
When cost containment concerns point toward reliance upon-and
potential manipulation of-the patient's intimate relationships, newly
won commitments to patient autonomy are especially in jeopardy. By
highlighting the significance of the patient's relationships with others,
I make no argument against respect for patient autonomy; instead I
* Professor, Harvard Law School. This essay was presented as the Rome Lecture at
the University of Maryland School of Law, March 23, 1994. I appreciate comments on
earlier presentations to the Pew Health Policy Program Annual Meeting, June 7, 1993; the
Harvard Program on Ethics and the Professions; and the Harvard Division on Medical
Ethics. I would like to thank particularly Emily Schulman, Rebecca Dresser, Michael
Hardimann, Howard Hiatt, Robert Singer, Joe Singer, Deborah Stone, Marcia Angell, and
Susan Wolf for their help.
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argue for reconceiving patient autonomy in light of the patient's rela-
tionships with intimate others.
I. PATIENTS IN PRACTICE
Nearly all the theories of medical ethics presume that the central
focus of medical ethics is the relationship between the physician and
the patient-each treated as a single person. Thanks to recent efforts
by David Rothman and others, the "physician"-side of that dyad is re-
ceiving clarifying correction. Rothman began his book, Strangers at the
Bedside, with this comment:
As late as 1969, the philosopher HansJonas could assert that
"the physician is obligated to the patient and to no one else
.... We may speak of a sacred trust; strictly by its terms, the
doctor is, as it were, alone with his patient and God." But
even as he wrote, the image of a physician alone with a pa-
tient was being supplanted by one of an examining room so
crowded that the physician had difficulty squeezing in and of
a patient surrounded by strangers.1
The rest of Rothman's book discusses the new complexities doctors
face due to the growth of medical specialties; the rise of human sub-
jects review committees and hospital ethics committees; various fiscal
controls such as Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs);2 and emerging
judicial and legislative regulation of health care decisions.' I believe
that Rothman's own argument would be strengthened by paying
greater attention to the expanding roles of health care providers, fo-
cusing especially on the expanding role of nurses.
More fundamentally, I will argue the patient side of the equation
also requires equal attention and explanation. I will briefly describe a
range of situations demonstrating the complexity about patients that
deserves attention. On one extreme, some clinical practice has always,
by necessity, dealt with more than one person or individual as "the
patient." Pregnancy is an obvious instance in which "the patient in
the bed" cannot fully be described as a single person. Dramatized
1. DAVIDJ. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE 1 (1991) (quoting HansJonas, Philo-
sophical Reflections on Experimenting with Human Subjects, 98 DAEDALUS 219 (1969)).
2. DRGs were created by the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA).
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF LEGAL MEDICINE, LEGAL MEDICINE: LEGAL DYNAMICS OF MEDICAL EN-
CouNTERs 427 (1988). Under this system, Medicare pays hospitals a uniform, fixed pay-
ment, which is determined mostly by the 'patient's diagnosis rather than the care or
treatment the patient actually receives. Id. Accordingly, the payment remains the same for
a particular ailment regardless of whether the patient spends one week or 15 days in the
hospital. Id.
3. See generally id.
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today with the use of ultrasound and the possibility of intrauterine
treatment, pregnancy presents the medical world with the woman and
the fetus whose interests are usually joined, but on occasion may not
be. 4
Contagious diseases present an example in which the "patient"
easily includes more than one person. Forty years ago, Michael Balint
usefully identified the contrasts among the presenting patient, the key
patient, and the treatable patient.5 In this light, the health care pro-
vider must come to perceive the individual who presents himself or
herself at the office as a member of a network of relationships that
potentially includes others who may have underlying or treatable con-
ditions. Moreover, public health approaches to managing contagious
diseases have long identified the chains of relationships between peo-
ple that are relevant to both treatment and prevention and make the
presenting patient simply the initial contact in what will become a se-
ries of patients to be tested and potentially treated.
When genetic testing becomes germane to diagnosing a particu-
lar patient's condition, the histories of family members assist the treat-
ment of "the patient in the bed," and family members may also
become patients if they subsequently receive testing that reveals a sim-
ilar condition. Accordingly, both contagious diseases and certain
kinds of genetic markers present the health care world with issues that
begin with one patient but often lead to the identification and treat-
ment of other patients.
This pattern reveals limitations in conventional rules that seek to
promote patient autonomy. For example, rules about confidentiality6
and informed consent 7 have been formed on the assumption that
only one patient is involved, when, in reality, a physician may be treat-
ing family members who may have exposed one another to a conta-
gious disease, such as HIV, or who may share genetically-linked
conditions. To respect the autonomy of each patient while pursuing
their health interests, the goals behind confidentiality and informed
4. More than one person must be viewed as "the patient" in the far more unusual
situation of Siamese twins.
5. See generally MICHAEL BALINT, THE DocrOR, His PATIENT AND THE ILLNESS (1954).
6. Confidentiality refers to patients' right to keep their person and records private
unless they consent or the law requires disclosure. Indeed, " [ a] ccess to a patient's body and
to confidential medical information is limited to the primary health care team specifically
rendering care to the patient, and to others with special permission." AMERICAN COLLEGE
OF LEGAL MEDICINE, supra note 2, at 208.
.7. Informed consent involves "informing the patient of the nature of diagnostic and
therapeutic procedures, and their advantages and disadvantages, such that the patient may
participate in accepting or rejecting procedures." Id at 118.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
consent require conversations with patients about their intimate rela-
tionships, and the rules on confidentiality and informed consent may
even require modification to protect the interests of other patients.
Family members or close associates to a patient may also become
patients in the sense of falling within the primary responsibility of the
health care provider when the initial patient dies, especially when the
family member reacts to the news in an extreme way.' More basically,
many health care providers acknowledge and attend to the ways in
which the actual incidence of disease and conditions of health status
reflect interpersonal relationships. One recent book concluded,
"There is now a mass of evidence to indicate that [social] support may
be one of the critical factors distinguishing those who remain healthy
from those who fall ill."9 The psychological sensitivity of the immune
system'0 is simply one domain of such evidence. For example, studies
confirm that "[f]or women, both psychologic and physical symptom
levels were significantly lower among those who had confidants and
friends."" Similarly, family members can often be the cause not only
of contagious diseases but also of psychosocial factors affecting non-
contagious diseases or disabilities. 2 The interaction of health statuses
of spouses is a striking example.'" Given these studies, any serious
consideration of preventive health care involves family members,
friends, and coworkers. Dr. Leon Eisenberg taught us of the impor-
tance of family, friends, and coworkers in a patient's decision to seek
health care' 4 and in a patient's own progress toward wellness.' 5 In
debates over whether to extend health care benefits to domestic part-
ners of employees, employers also are persuaded by evidence of the
8. ROBERT BucKmAN, How TO BREAK BAD NEWS: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROFES-
SIONALS 183 (1992) (noting that the patient's family may become the health care worker's
primary responsibility and also noting the difficulty of dealing with the family when a pa-
tient dies unexpectedly).
9. MARC PILISUK & SusAN HILLIER PARKS, THE HEAUNG WEB: SOCIAL NETWORKS AND
HUMAN SURVIVAL 29 (1986).
10. Id. at 40-41 (noting that social support affects those systems of the body designed to
deal with the externalities that cause illness).
11. Leon Eisenberg, What Makes Persons "Patients" and Patients "Well"?, 69 AM. J. MED.
277, 282 (1980).
12. David D. Schmidt, The Family as the Unit of Medical Care, 7J. FAM. PRAc. 303 (1979).
13. See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 283 (explaining that research has shown that age-
specific mortality rates are two to four times greater for widowers than for married men);
Schmidt, supra note 12; see alsoJohn G. Bruhn, Effects of Chronic Illness on the Family, 4J. FAM.
PRAc. 1057, 1057-60 (1977) (discussing the detrimental effects of chronic illness on family
members).
14. See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 279 (noting that patients often discuss their health
status with family and friends before visiting health care providers).
15. See id. at 284.
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relevance of the relationship between the health status of and care for
household members to the health and well-being of their employees.
Thus, the "patient in the bed" may be treated effectively only through
careful assessment of the individual's relationships with others and
sometimes interventions involving others will be necessary for treat-
ment and for preventive measures.
Probably most familiar to health care providers is the significance
of family members and close friends in contributing to decisions
about care for those individuals who cannot make decisions for them-
selves. In this circumstance, the others involved in the decisionmak-
ing are not patients, and their individual preferences and opinions
are not viewed as "factors" or "information sources" relevant to treat-
ment. Nevertheless, the intimates of the patient provide norms, val-
ues, or information about the patient's own preferences and interests
when a treatment decision must be made. The dramatic growth of
heroic or extraordinary care 6 involves health care providers in close
relationships with the families or friends of partially or fully incompe-
tent patients, whether those patients are children or gravely impaired
adults.
When someone besides the ostensible patient provides the source
of knowledge about the patient's history, desires, or treatment direc-
tion, ethicists and lawyers establish fictions to protect the image of the
doctor treating the solitary and autonomous patient. One such fiction
is "substituted judgment."17 Such fancy verbal footwork is a sign that
something else may be going on. The health care professionals may
sincerely try to preserve the single patient as the primary focus for
care. Even if this is their goal, however, it is necessary that the medical
team be closely involved with those who are intimately affected by the
welfare, care, and aftercare of the patient."8 Moreover, cross-cultural
comparisons of medical practices indicate the great significance of
family in many cultures and recommend degrees of involvement and
16. Heroic or extraordinary care involves the use of extreme measures to keep a pa-
tient alive when death is imminent. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FORGO
LIFE-SUSTAINING TR.ATMENT 83-87 (1983).
17. Substituted judgment involves the appointment of a surrogate for patients who are
not competent to make medical decisions for themselves. To the best of their abilities,
these surrogates should make decisions in the same manner as the patient would have. Id.
at 44-45.
18. Se RICHARD SHERLOCK & C. MARY DINGUS, FAMILIES AND THE GRAVELY ILL: ROLES,
RULES, AND RIGHTS 147 (1988) (arguing that health care providers must elicit information
from the patient's family members to provide the patient the best care).
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deference to family members in patient decisions that might be
deemed violations of patient autonomy in other contexts. 19
Moving even further away from the idea that anyone but the pa-
tient-in-the-bed is the subject of the medical care, family members, or
other intimate associates, can be crucial to providing patient care.
The patient care provided by intimates affects the cure or healing of
stroke victims, orthopedic patients, alcoholics, obese individuals, pa-
tients with high risk of heart disease, and candidates for organ trans-
plants.20  Further, decisions about whether to hospitalize,
institutionalize, or discharge patients center on the capacity of inti-
mates to provide care and support for the patient. Ruth Macklin
writes of the ethical dilemma presented by an eighty-four-year-old hos-
pital patient who desired to be discharged so that he could live with
his thirty-five-year-old son even though that son had previously failed
to provide his father with proper care and nutrition. The medical
staff debated whether to send him home, knowing his health would
worsen, or to keep him in the hospital against his will.' Despite the
team's view, which was based on the actual effects of family members
on a patient's health, Macklin recommended that the medical staff
respect the autonomy and preference of the patient.22
Many clinicians must explicitly address the interaction between
family caregivers and recovering patients.23 For instance, what should
happen when an elderly patient is ready to leave the hospital and re-
turn home, but returning home and depending on the care of an
elderly spouse may jeopardize the health of that spouse as well?
Caregiving has predictable negative effects on the physical and emo-
tional health of the caregivers, ranging from depression and stress syn-
dromes, to increased susceptibility to physical health problems. 24 At
the same time, however, separation of spouses can in some circum-
stances also impair the well-being of one or both of them.
As these examples suggest, an exclusive focus on the individual
patient's health care needs raises two possible dangers: (1) the pa-
19. SeeJill Klessig, Cross-Cultural Medicine A Decade Later: The Effect of Values and Culture
on Life-Support Decisions, 157 W.J. MED. 316 (1992) (explaining that physicians must discuss
life-support issues "in a culturally sensitive way");Jessica H. Muller & Brian Desmond, Ethi-
cal Dilemmas in a Cross-Cultural Context: A Chinese Example 157 W. J. MED. 323, 327 (1992)
(stating that doctors should be sensitive to the norms of various cultures that may have
different concepts of patient autonomy).
20. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 309.
21. RUTH MACKUN, MORTAL CHOICES: BioETHICs IN TODAY'S WORLD 139 (1987).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Council on Scientific Affairs, American Medical Association, Physicians and
Family Caregivers: A Model for Partnership, 269 JAMA 1282 (1992).
24. Id. at 1283.
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tient's own views about the relationships with and interests of the inti-
mate others may point in a different direction than the medical
advice; and (2) what would be good medically for the patient may not
be good medically or otherwise for relatives or friends who must care
for the patient. Again, the conventional notions of patient autonomy
do not adequately illuminate these dangers nor point toward sensitive
responses.
Given evidence of the mutual impact people have on one an-
other's health, some scholars advocate a shift to an interactional or
systems viewpoint in addressing health care issues.25 They recom-
mend a focus on the effect of social interactions on the onset of dis-
ease and its course26 and on providing care for caregivers.27 Thus, the
AMA's Council on Scientific Affairs recently recommended that physi-
cians treat the patient and the caregiver "as a single unit of care,"
while also considering the "caregiver as a partner with the physician"
in patient care. 28 As a practical matter, consideration of the caregiver
would demand reimbursement for physician time spent in educating
and counseling caregivers and financial support for further research
about the needs of caregivers.2' Along the same line, others urge phy-
sicians to use their knowledge of family dynamics "to create strong
family support for the ill person." °
Each of these recommendations remains consistent with the as-
sumption that the focus of care is on the individual patient. Pursuant
to these recommendations, attention to the family members or
friends is deemed relevant in order to enhance the health or treat-
ment of the individual patient. This attention has been described as
treating "'the family in the patient, rather than the patient in the fam-
ily.' 3 1 Yet, it is not beyond debate to propose a shift in this funda-
mental premise. Indeed, a few years ago, John Hardwig shifted this
premise by arguing that the interests of a patient's family should be
25. John H. Weakland, "Family Somatics---A Neglected Edge, FAM. PROCESS 263 (1977)
(advocating the focus of health care mainly on family systems to study the handling of
human problems).
26. Id.
27. See Counsel on Scientific Affairs, supra note 23, at 1283.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1284.
30. Bruhn, supra note 13, at 1060 (noting that communication between the physician
and the family builds confidence and is often the most effective treatment available for
chronic illness).
31. RONALDJ. CHRISTIE & C. BARRY HOFFMASTER, ETHICAL ISSUES IN FAMILY MEDICINE 10
(1986) (quoting Dr. Michael Brennan).
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considered alongside the interests of the patient."2 Hardwig stated
that "it is sometimes the moral thing to do for a physician to sacrifice
the interests of her patient to those of nonpatients-specifically, to
those of the other members of the patient's family."" He defined
family broadly to encompass those who are close to the patient, in-
cluding friends and companions." Hardwig argued that given the
longer duration of many illnesses and the high costs of medical care,
past assumptions that the patient's interests should always prevail de-
serve reassessment.35 Hardwig specifically recommended that the in-
terests of family members be treated equally with the interests of the
patient.36 Equal treatment of patients and their family members
would be more honest and more fair, he maintained, than current
theory and practice. 7
Although Hardwig argued for equal consideration of family mem-
bers' interests, his analysis does not entirely depart from the premise
of the individual person as the patient. A more fundamental displace-
ment of the individual arises when society itself becomes the unit of
analysis, as is the case not only in conceptions of public health, work-
place and environmental safety concerns, but also in emerging de-
mands for cost-effectiveness and rationing in health care. Rather than
employing all possible treatments for the particular individual patient,
proponents of rationing health care urge that only reasonable care
should be provided to all potential patients.38 Critics call this "ration-
ing" and oppose such dilution of the health care provider's central
commitment to each particular patient. Some have urged a specific
separation between the practitioner who delivers care and the policy-
makers who determine allocations of resources.39 Current cost-con-
trol programs in various forms of managed care render this idea out-
moded, however, and primary care physicians and nurses have indeed
32. John Hardwig, What About the Family ?, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 10
(acknowledging the interests of the family may guide and support "physicians, patients,
and families in the throes of agonizing moral decisions").
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Id. at 7.
37. See id. (arguing that "medical and nonmedical interests of the same magnitude
deserve equal consideration in making treatment decisions").
38. See ALBERT R.JONSEN, THE NEW MEDICINE AND THE OLD ETHICS 58 (1990) (arguing
that justice requires "the competent practitioner to treat each patient with as full a range of
resources as is comparable with the capability of other unknown and unseen patients to
receive treatment when their time comes").
39. For an influential statement of this view see Howard H. Hiatt, Protecting the Medical
Commons: Who is Responsible?, 293 NEw ENG. J. MED. 235-40 (1975).
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become gatekeepers by controlling access to medical resources. Done
ultimately in the interests of the entire risk-pool-or community, cost-
containment expands the notion of the beneficiary beyond the indi-
vidual patient.4"
Standard public health and cost-containment rationales
subordinate interests of the individual to those of society and jeopard-
ize the basic medical ethics commitment to individual autonomy and
well-being. I do not propose to import these arguments for subordi-
nating the interests of the individual patient to the rest of medical
ethics. Indeed, I worry that an implicit shift against patient autonomy
as an ideal is well underway. Given this shift, can we render patient
autonomy meaningful in circumstances in which the "patient-in-the-
bed" implicates others in the gathering of information, the treatment
decision, the treatment process, or the provision of after-care? This
question presupposes the desirability of retaining the commitment to
individual patient autonomy, which I will now defend, while arguing
for a revision of this conception in light of many patients' important
relationships with intimates.
II. PROBLEMS WITH SHIFTING FROM THE INDIVIDUAL AS PATIENT
The most obvious objection to a shift away from the focus on the
individual patient is the danger that individuals will become the
means for accomplishing other people's ends. This shift in focus that
may result in other people's ends being met at the expense of the
individual would violate ethical commitments to individual autonomy,
integrity, and dignity. As I have suggested, such ethical violations are
already often tolerated in the name of public health and cost-contain-
ment concerns. Perhaps these violations are tolerated only as excep-
tions to the rule, or only when tailored to maximize concern for the
individual consistent with broader societal objectives. We, or others,
could argue that the individual patient implicitly consents to the in-
cursions represented by public health and cost-containment initiatives
40. This view has a long history in the field of public health. For example, concern
about the overall health of the community directs primary care providers to refuse a pa-
tient's request for antibiotic medication for a minor illness if expanded use by patients in
that context would risk the development of a drug-resistant strain posing greater danger to
the community at large. Similarly, vaccination of healthy individuals-carrying with it
some slight risk to the individual-is a pillar of public health activity given the greater good
to the community arising from universal vaccination. Yet, when the societal and commu-
nity concerns attend solely to financial rather than health interests, an important and
troubling shift has occurred. For a discussion about cost-containment, see generally PREsi-
DENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS, supra note 16, at 95-100 (discussing
the constraints societal interests place on the use of life-sustaining treatment).
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because the individual shares in the resulting benefits. When the
health care focus on the individual patient shifts not to society but
instead to the family or intimate group, conceptual, practical, and
moral problems can arise. Making individual autonomy meaningful
in light of the intimate relationships of the patient requires work. The
dangers of shifting from the individual patient, and the steps needed
to strengthen respect for patient autonomy given the facts of patients'
relationships must be addressed.
A. Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Problems with "Family" Medicine
The interpersonal nature of health and well-being leads some
health care providers to advocate a shift from the individual patient to
the family as the patient. Yet conceptual confusion arises with efforts
to articulate a strong version of "the family" as patient.41 This formu-
lation implies that the family is a reified entity.42 In reality, the family
is not an entity, but a collection of individuals who have relationships
with one another. Perhaps with this idea in mind, one observer con-
cluded that the meaning of family, in family practice, "refers to the
form of relationship established between the physician and the pa-
tient," rather than the definition of the patient.43
Alternately, the family as patient could mean simply that the
health care provider treats, or is willing to treat, all members of a
given family and can draw upon the knowledge base acquired during
such treatment when dealing with points of common risk or benefit.44
Similarly, a systems-approach, as used in family therapy, may guide the
health care provider in tracing the source of medical problems and in
developing rehabilitation or treatment plans.45 These approaches are
ethically suspect, however, if they permit less rigor in protecting the
confidences of individual patients, or in guarding against the conflict-
ing interests of the professional who provides treatment for two re-
lated patients. Hardwig himself argues that "the idea that the whole
family is one patient is too monolithic. The conflicts of interests, be-
41. Ruth Macklin traces the conceptual difficulty to the idea of "treating" the family
because treatment in this context is ambiguous. "It can mean 'the performance of ther-
apy,' but it also has a nonmedical sense, meaning 'dealing with' or 'behaving toward.'"
MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 132.
42. Id. at 71; see also Lynn P. Carmichael, The Family in Medicine, Process or Entity?, 3J.
FAM. PRAc. 562 (1976) (arguing that the family, as a unit of care, is uninvolved in the
practice of general medicine).
43. See Carmichael, supra note 42, at 562.
44. See MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 68.
45. Id.
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liefs, and values among family members are often too real and run too
deep to treat all members as 'the patient.'"
46
After acknowledging potential conflicts among family members
facing medical care decisions, how should the family doctor behave?
Is the family physician the judge of potentially competing claims of
family members-claims regarding treatment and care affecting other
family members? How may the family physician or nurse-practitioner
serve as an advocate for one family member's interests when they di-
verge from the interests of other family members? Adjudicating this
conflict is a difficult task for the health care professional. Experience
in the legal system shows it is very difficult for one person to serve as
judge without the input of others entrusted with the specific tasks of
articulating and advocating competing interests. If the family health
care provider is the judge, does each family member need a separate
advocate? This proposal is at best impractical and expensive, and, at
worst, an ill-conceived extension of the adversarial system.
For reasons of this kind, it seems unwise to articulate the interests
that family members and intimates may have in the health status and
medical treatment of their loved one as "rights." Indeed, Macklin sug-
gests that such thinking is mistaken. According to Macklin, the emo-
tional concerns and interests of family members should not be
confused with "rights."47 Instead, what families do have, she main-
tains, are "anxiety, fear, guilt, anger, hope and sadness. It is these
feelings that doctors have to contend with, and that some mistakenly
label 'rights.'" 48
The recent history of family practice illustrates similar difficulties
in defining the idea of the "family" as patient. This history demon-
strates that departure from the individual patient cannot be sustained
ethically or conceptually. Launched in the early 1970s with the claim
that the patient should be the family, family practice has increasingly
exhibited a renewed commitment to the individual as patient, while
acknowledging the individual's family context and emphasizing the
whole person rather than the disease.4 9 This return reflects both the
difficulties clinicians encountered in practice and general philosophic
assaults on the idea of "the family" as the patient.
46. Hardwig, supra note 32, at 5.
47. See MACKLIN, supra note 21, at 132.
48. Id. at 138.
49. See CHRISTIE & HOFFMASTER, supra note 31, at 10 (noting that a "different approach
distinguishes between treating... all members of a family and simply being aware of the
influence that family relationships have on the health of a person").
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For example, and perhaps ironically, one leading critic charged
family medicine with threatening the very commitment to the whole-
person medicine. In 1976, Dr. Marshall Marinker charged that family
medicine undermines whole-person medicine and threatens the in-
tegrity of the person because "the doctor must shift his gaze from the
person as an individual to the family as a group."5" According to
Marinker, this shift in focus to the family "destroys the intimate and
entirely personal dialogue of whole-person medicine."5' Professor
Marinker also argues that the family might suffocate an individual and
that family medicine might embolden a physician to impose treat-
ment on a person who has not accepted the role of patient, or may
even encourage the health care provider to escape from hard work
with the individual who needs help.52 In response, defenders of fam-
ily medicine retreat to an emphasis on the individual as the primary
focus of care, with family members as residual or marginal benefi-
ciaries of help, insofar as that help would aid the patient.53 In this
weaker version, the argument for "the family" as patient is compatible
with a continuing focus on the individual, with the family, or other
intimates, assuming importance only as the context in which the pa-
tient lives.54
Even when defending the strong version of the family as patient,
family practice advocates reflect ambivalence and confusion about the
relative weight to be given to individual patient and family member's
interests. The coauthors of a leading book on ethics in family practice
offer this as a central example: a seventy-four-year-old Native Ameri-
can woman, who has already had one leg amputated following compli-
cations from diabetes, is advised by her doctor that amputation of her
second foot is necessary. She refuses, preferring to stay at home, on
the reservation, and seek traditional North American remedies. She is
also the custodian of two granddaughters who are undergoing turbu-
lent adolescent periods. The physician believes the patient should
have the amputation, as this procedure would better preserve her life
so that she could care for the granddaughters.55 It is plausible to view
50. Marshall Marinker, The Family in Medicine, 69 PROCEEDINGS ROYAL Soc'Y OF MED.
115, 123 (Feb. 1976) (arguing that the theory of family medicine threatens the integrity of
the person).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See CHISTIE & HOFFMASTER, supra note 31, at 73 (assailing Marinker's construction
of "respect for autonomy as an inviolable moral principle").
54. See id. at 68 (noting that effective management of a patient's problems may require
family intervention).
55. Id. at 79-80.
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the patient's decision as a statement of her preference to resist medi-
cal treatment that had not seemed to help her in the past or as a
statement of her acceptance of death.
The coauthors report that, in the actual case, the physician suc-
cessfully enlisted others to help convince the patient to obtain the am-
putation. 6 The patient had the amputation, returned home, cared
for the granddaughters, and provided strength, stability and discipline
for them for two more years."' The authors conclude:
This felicitous result was due largely to the broader perspec-
tive of Mrs. L's family physician. If the focus had been on
only the individual patient, no efforts to change her mind
probably would have been made. But because the focus was
on the entire family, both the interests of Mrs. L. and her
granddaughters were considered. Happily, these interests
turned out to be compatible."
I suggest that it is not just "happy," but crucial that the interests of the
patient and her granddaughters were compatible. If these interests
were not compatible, it is hard to believe the authors would have se-
lected this case as a central example. Moreover, implicit in this story
is the suggestion that the patient's own understanding of her interests
included her commitment to care for her granddaughters. 9 If family
medicine means respecting the patient's own commitment to family
members as part of the treatment plan, this approach is entirely com-
patible with a focus on the individual. This expansion in focus consid-
ers the medical and nonmedical interests of the patient, rather than
shifting the emphasis to the interests of nonpatients. In other words,
the health care provider's goal is to treat the individual patient and
respect her autonomy, but that individual's own relationships may
modify her autonomy or reflect commitments that the health care
provider should, in turn, try to respect and support. This theory of
family medicine treats the individual as the patient and thus avoids
the danger of compromising that person's autonomy and interests.
In these contexts, it is important to emphasize and preserve the
role of the health care provider not as a decision-maker, but as an
adviser and helper. Much of this discussion contemplates practice at
56. Id. at 81.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 94. The authors note that "[c] onstruing autonomy in terms of facilitating
personal growth and development not only is compatible with the underlying philosophy
of family medicine; it also contributes to a more complete picture of the physician-patient
relationship." Id.
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the moment when the doctor or nurse explores options with a patient
and considers both the impact those options may have on loved ones
and the impact loved ones may have on those options. Emphasizing
the centrality of the patient's choice supports the autonomy of those
patients who wish an option contrary to the wants of an intimate
other, and those patients who place the interests of another over their
own interests.
B. Moral and Political Dangers in Focusing on Individuals as if They
Have No Relationships that Matter
Perhaps paradoxically, a focus on the individual patient informed
by research on family and social supports produces another set of
moral and political mistakes. In brief, the focus on the individual pa-
tient has the potential risk of subordinating the needs of caregivers-
who are disproportionately women 6 0 _-to the needs of patients. Such
an approach also risks excluding from health care resources ethnic
and racial minority groups that have historically been excluded from
health care resources.6' Finally, a focus solely on the individual within
the family or social system may end up blaming those without vital
supports.
I will briefly discuss each of these points. A patient's social sup-
ports should be called what they are: actual people, whether spouses,
adults, children, or friends. No doubt the presence of vital and capa-
ble people can make a difference in the treatment, recovery, and care
of many patients, but who will consider the needs of these caretakers
from their point of view, not just the viewpoint of the patient? Not
only is there a basic unfairness if the needs of the social supports are
not considered, but there may also be a systematic bias. More often
than not, these caretakers are women. 62 The statistics show that the
overwhelming majority of caregivers are women in the care of the eld-
erly. A recent estimate indicates that 2.2 million family members and
friends provide health care and other instrumental assistance to about
1.3 million frail, elderly individuals.6 3 Approximately two-thirds of
these caregivers are women.' As previously indicated, the impact of
such responsibilities on caregivers may result in serious mental and
60. Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 23, at 1282.
61. See Steven P. Wallace & Chin-Yin Lew-Ting, Getting By at Home: Community-Based
Long-term Care of Latino Elders, 157 W.J. MED. 337 (1992).
62. See Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 23, at 1282.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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physical burdens to those caregivers. 5 Similar gender-based concerns
can also be raised about the care of persons with disabilities, and the
care of transplant candidates. If attention to family and social context
simply aids the individual patient, and if traditional gender roles per-
sist in identifying women relatives and friends as the obvious
caregivers for patients, an inequality in the distribution of caregiving
may result. If those women are also juggling other responsibilities-
to children or to their jobs-justice would demand broader social sup-
port for the caregiving these women provide to patients.
Some patients may have concerns about imposing caregiving re-
sponsibilities on their relatives, while other patients prefer not to do
so. Still other patients may be willing to impose caregiving responsi-
bilities on their relatives or lack an ability to express a preference.
Consider the case of "Evan," described by Dr. Janet Haas in materials
developed by the Hastings Center."6 Evan is a twenty-six-year-old sin-
gle man who suffered severe injuries following an automobile acci-
dent. After extensive medical treatment that stabilized his condition,
the neurosurgeon wants to discharge him. 7 If Medicaid would pay
for his care, Evan might be placed in a rehabilitation hospital, in the
hope that he could improve sufficiently to receive private care. 6
Evan, however, shows no willingness to cooperate with therapy. He
manifests some post-traumatic amnesia and shows intermittent agita-
tion.6' Through a spelling board he indicates that he wants to go
home. 70 It remains unclear what "home" would mean, since he had
been unemployed and essentially homeless prior to the accident.
71
Evan's sister is his closest relative. She raised Evan and several of
his other siblings since the time he was eight years old.71 She cur-
rently works full time as a management trainee. The other obvious
candidate to care for Evan is his mother, but she recently took charge
of caring for his grandmother, who is seventy-eight-years old and suf-
fers from numerous medical problems.7' Neither the sister nor the
mother-nor any other relatives-have offered their homes to Evan.74
65. Id.
66. CASE STUDIES IN ETHics AND MEDICAL REHABILITATION 29 (Janet Haas et al., eds.,
1988).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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The rehabilitation admission decision depends in part upon the
candidate's final placement. The rehabilitation hospital wants to
avoid taking a patient it cannot discharge due to lack of a placement.
The rehabilitation staff can sensibly defend this position on several
grounds. People with head injuries, especially, require therapy
designed in conjunction with their ultimate placement because adapt-
ability and generalizing skills from one environment to another may
be very difficult. A candidate who seems unlikely to have discharge
plans may end up occupying a bed that could better serve another
patient. Furthermore, a patient who cannot be discharged by the re-
habilitation hospital is also likely to lack finances to reimburse the
hospital. As a result, the hospital may end up "eating" the cost of
Evan's care.
In this light, Evan's case poses an especially difficult question
about whether the medical personnel should encourage Evan's sister
or his mother to assume his care. The doctor who prepared the case
study recommended admission to the rehabilitation hospital.75 He
portrayed the problem as one of risking denial of the rehabilitation
effort simply because of an undesirable and poor patient.76 The phy-
sician argued that Evan's desperate lack of nonmedical resources,
ranging from an unresponsive family to poverty, and his own unwill-
ingness to cooperate with treatment, should notjustify denial of treat-
ment that could help him. This line of argument, however, becomes
the rationale for pressuring family members to depart from their
stated views and plans. The physician concluded that "[r] ehabilitation
personnel must work diligently with Evan's sister and other family
members" and educate them about his needs, and draw them "into
Evan's plan of treatment."77
A contrasting view of this case, offered by two nonmedical com-
mentators, questions this solution as serving society, but not the family
or even Evan himself.78
It is less costly (or so we believe) to have his family care for
him than an institution, and his caretakers would certainly
be better off if Evan can be taught to behave predictably and
in socially acceptable ways .... The hospital staff seem to
have identified Evan's sister as the family member most re-
sponsible for Evan and most likely to arrange family care for
him.... Even if we are not willing to pass judgment on the
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 34.
78. Id. at 36 (commentary of Deborah A. Stone & David R. Pokross).
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quality of life Evan might lead given his prognosis, that same
prognosis tells us a lot about the quality of life his sister (or
other caretaker) might have. She has already once before
carried the responsibility of raising somebody else's children.
Now her siblings are grown and she has an opportunity for
some economic and social advancement in a management
training program-an opportunity she would probably have
to forfeit if she agreed to take Evan into her home. I believe
the choice ought to be hers.7"
This view contrasts with the temptation for any one treating Evan to
play upon a woman's sense of guilt in trying to find a good solution to
his treatment problem. 0 Attention to the patient's interest alone will
not guard against the temptation to implicate a woman's conscience.
Yet add to this analysis the patient's own preference to avoid therapy
and his apparent refusal to receive treatment. His apparent prefer-
ence should not itself render him incompetent to decide.
Thus, in addition to the rather modest proposal that respecting a
patient's autonomy includes respecting their own commitments to
others, I Offer this bolder argument. Respect for patient autonomy
should not entail disregard for the autonomy of others in their lives.
This argument gains special significance in light of potential patterns
of ethnic bias in the utilization of health care resources."'
To explore the possibility of ethnic and class bias, two researchers
studied the use of health care resources by Latino families.8 2 They
found that many such families do not use in-home health-care services
even when they are in contact with physicians.8 " The authors sug-
gested that "[o]ne reason physician visits may not increase in-home
health services use is that many physicians may observe the family pro-
viding in-home assistance and assume that such assistance is provided
for cultural reasons."8 4 Acknowledging that older Latinos often ex-
pect assistance from their families, family involvement in health care
decisions, and Spanish-language use in quality care, the researchers
emphasized that formal services could also improve the status of the
patients and their care-givers and that in-home health care services
might be welcomed if offered." Thus, physicians should not assume
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See Wallace & Lew-Ting, supra note 61.
82. See id.
83. Id. at 338-39 (arguing that physicians should not presume that Latino families are
taking care of their disabled elders simply because of cultural preference).
84. Id. at 343.
85. See id.
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that Latino families taking care of their disabled elders at home do so
simply because of a cultural preference. 6 Instead, physicians should
provide information and advice about the availability of in-home
health-care services . 7 Groups that have had to rely on family and so-
cial supports may risk exclusion from health care services because they
do not seem to need those services when in fact the patient and
health-care providers could well benefit from precisely those
services.8a
Finally, is there any danger that society may blame people who
lack adequate social supports if they become ill? Or will society blame
people who decline to provide care for their relatives or intimates who
become ill? Recognition of the benefits provided by family and inti-
mate caretakers may point in these directions. As Weakland says,
"[a]ny positive findings about interaction and disease might well, at
least initially, be seen more as accusations that people are making
their loved ones sick than as a realistic and helpful recognition of
how, even without benefit of ceremony, we are in life together, for
better or worse, in sickness and in health."89
Danger arises when attention to the individual patient's benefits
from care provided by family members or friends overrides any con-
sideration of the needs or interests of those others. Overriding the
concerns of family or friends poses an immediate danger because
these other individuals have interests as well. More subtly, attention
to others matters because the patient may care about the interests of
those others. Here is where a refined notion of autonomy would de-
mand deference to the individual's own commitments to others. Ad-
dressing interpersonal commitments and political deliberation, one
philosopher comments that
when John or Mary accords priority to theirJohn-Mary inter-
est over their interests considered atomistically, they do what
is best for themselves as members of an entity they relation-
ally comprise.... The couple John-Mary is an internal rela-
tion formed by John and Mary. It cannot be decomposed
into two radically independent entities, the (atomic) individ-
uals John and Mary, because in this case it is the relation
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Marilyn Friedman, The Practice of Partiality, 101 ETHics 818, 829 (1991) (relying
on people's desires to favor their loved ones may prevent redistribution of resources
needed for those who do not have them).
89. Weakland, supra note 25, at 272.
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itself, not the parties related, that is fundamental for the pro-
posed deliberation.90
Where a patient is competent and unambivalent, respecting patient
autonomy requires deference to the patient who prefers not to be dis-
charged to the relative's care. More difficult issues arise when the pa-
tient is competent but ambivalent. Even in that common
circumstance, I propose maintaining respect for the individual pa-
tient's autonomy by acknowledging the significance of relationships in
the life of that patient, while also respecting the autonomy of those
intimate others and not treating them as objects to be manipulated as
part of patient care.
Some may fear that respecting the autonomy of the family and
friends of patients means abandoning the patient and losing the
chance to involve those intimate others significantly in the patient
treatment and care. This would be a false and sorry picture of auton-
omy.91 Many wives and husbands, lovers and parents, children and
aunts, and even friends, will chose earnestly and lovingly to attend to a
patient in stages of acute and chronic care, as well as in prevention
efforts. Similarly, many patients, when allowed to act autonomously,
will choose unselfishly. The crucial role for the health care provider is
not to push toward these ends, but instead, to help people recognize
and articulate their individual and mutual interests before and during
health problems.
Consider an elderly couple with this difficulty. After the hus-
band's stroke, hospitalization has stabilized his condition, but his doc-
tor believes he cannot return to independent living at home and
needs the full care offered by a nursing home. A nursing home, how-
ever, would exhaust his social security and Medicaid benefits, leaving
his wife unable to pay the rent. We quickly imagine how his wife may
want him to come home, and that he may want nursing home care.
Yet she may tell him to go to the nursing home for his own good, and
he may say he is coming home for her good. This version is reminis-
cent of an O'Henry short story, The Gift of the Magi,92 in which an
90. ANDREW LEVINE, THE GENERAL WILL: RoussEAu, MARX, COMMUNISM 30 (1993) (dis-
cussing deliberations about "the general will").
91. Analogous debates surround contemporary meanings of sovereignty in interna-
tional relations. A conventional view of the nation state as a "billiard ball," distinct and
opaque, fails to account for the varied forms of interconnection and interdependence na-
tions build with one another. And yet many scholars fear that abandoning the conven-
tional view of sovereignty risks damaging national self-determination-or pushing toward
more expressions of selfishness. See Ann-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and In-
ternational Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L LAw 205 (1993).
92. 0. HENRY, The Gift of the Magi, in COMPLETE WoRKS OF 0. HENRY (1937).
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impoverished couple wish to surprise one another with presents. She
sells her hair to buy a chain for his pocket watch, while he sells his
watch to buy combs for her hair. This story is not only a touching
portrait of love's ironies, but also clearly indicates that, in Lyndon B.
Johnson's immortal phrase, there was "a failure to communicate."
Perhaps health care providers can help a patient and loved one com-
municate to avoid such ironies. Perhaps even a third alternative is
feasible, such as sufficient home health care to permit the patient to
return home to his wife.
CONCLUSION
In summary, patient autonomy sounds lovely but can become
meaningless unless it is understood in the context of the patient's real
and pressing relationships with family members or intimate others.
Yet, a shift in focus from the individual to a broader group as "patient"
raises conceptual, practical, and moral problems. More defensible is a
strengthened focus on the individual as someone whose autonomy in-
cludes affirmed membership in families and social groups. Relying on
those others to help the individual patient may raise issues of fairness
and impose health and emotional burdens on those caregivers. Who
will attend to those caregivers as patients and as partners in the health
care system? 9 3 Respect for patient autonomy demands respect for the
patient's relationships, and also for the autonomy of those with whom
the patient shares relationships. Perhaps it is not surprising, then,
that my closing question asks about the health and emotional needs of
caregivers, or in other words, to return to the Abbott and Costello
routine of my introduction, "What's on second?"94
93. See Council on Scientific Affairs, supra note 23, at 1282 (proposing partnership be-
tween physicians and family caregivers).
94. Pressure to treat caregivers, family members, and associates as patients may stem
from conceptions and reimbursement schemes that deny help to anyone who is not a pa-
tient, or who is not sick. Besides dealing with this problem with more expansive notions of
"patient," this society could consider adopting other forms of assistance, such as respite
care, day care, and a better social safety net.
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